





























DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE 
MIDDLEBURY, VERMONT 05753 
 
http://www.middlebury.edu/~econ One Welfare State for Europe: A Costly
Utopia?




This paper addresses the question of the social policy harmoniza-
tion in the European Union. In adopting a common monetary policy
Europe isfaced with structural and ⁄scal concerns, asnational growth
levels di¤er. Another possible factor in output shocks arethe levels of
various social expenditures in the member countries. OECD data on
the level of social program expenditures in four EU countries will be
compared to ¢uctuations in GDP growth to identify existing relation-
ships. Signi⁄cant relationships between independent social expendit-
urepolicy and GDP growth shocks portends structural harmonization
as an improvement if Europe is to take full advantage of the common
market. However, the e¤ects of expenditure levels may be easier to
identify and predict than the dynamic e¤ects ofpolicy change. As the
e¤ects offuturepolicy changes aremoredi¢cult to ascertain, harmon-
ization may not consistently appear to be a Pareto-optimum solution
to asymmetric shocks.
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11 Introduction
The LisbonLabor and Social A¤airs Councils consolidated aprocess of trans-
formation in European policy style which began in 1992 with recommend-
ations on social protection "convergence." Policy innovation in favor of a
social Europe occurred in two main areas: gender, with a series of initiatives
"mainstreaming" gender equality across a wide array of EU programs; and
employment, with the "Luxembourg process" launched in 1997 seeking a co-
ordination of national policies (Rodhes 2000). In July 1999, the Commission
proposed a "concerted strategy for modernizing social protection". And un-
der the Finnish presidency in 1999 a group of o¢cials was asked to take the
process forward. That groupzs ⁄rst major report (May 2000) was submitted
by Coreper and the Council to the European Council meeting held in Feira,
Portugal, on 19 and 20 June, and its conclusions now underpin o¢cial EU
policy.
The Portuguese presidency of the European Union (EU) in 2000 was the
⁄rst one to put ahead on the European agenda the discussion on "Social
Europe". Both the ethical layer and the economic one have been considered
by the Portuguese presidency. Two key aspects can be emphasized. On the
one hand, there has been a quest for a new synthesis in EU social policy,
reconciling ¢exibility and security in labor markets, and solidarity and sus-
tainability in broader welfare programs. The special meetingof the European
Council in Lisbon on 23 and 24 March underlined the need to create an "act-
ive welfare state" via a "positive strategy which combines competitiveness
with social cohesion" (Rodhes 2000). The Commissionzs Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines published shortly before the Lisbon Summit presents a
clear recipe for reform combining at once the ethical dimensions with the
economic one: "reducing the tax burden on low-wage labor, encouraging real
wages to increase in line with labor productivity, facilitating access to train-
ing, reforming tax and bene⁄t systems to ensure appropriate incentives and
rewards for participation in active working life and negotiating a moderniz-
ation of labor markets including ¢exible working hours and a review of tight
job protection legislation and high severance payments."
On theother hand, there has alsobeen a search for a middle path between
EU intervention via directives and the alternative of leaving policy instru-
ments in the hands of the member states, thereby renouncing broader so-
cial policy ambitions. The "open method of coordination", as outlined by
the Portuguese Presidency, is composed of four elements (Mosher 2000): 1)
2⁄xed guidelines set for the Union with short, medium, and long term goals;
2) quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks; 3) European
guidelines translated into national and regional policies and targets; and
4) periodic monitoring, evaluation, and peer review, organized as a mutual
learning process (Portuguese Presidency, 2000).
Thus, previously considered by EU policy makers, the next question in
the economic literature is the organization of the welfare state. The logic is
that an integrated market may require individual states to relinquish some
control of their welfare policies. Indeed, the issues surrounding the reform of
social expenditures are relevant for two reasons. First, asymmetric economic
shocks may be generated by di¤erences in social expenditures. Second, with
integration into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) the individual
countries have come under pressure to limit public spending in order to keep
public de⁄cits within the boundaries of the SGP. This constraint will limit
the ability to have an individual ⁄scal response during an asymmetric shock.
A country has to consider structural reform to increase its ability to respond
to shocks: a more e¢cient welfare state would leave more room for a ⁄scal
response to shocks.
This paper seeks to answer the question about the relevancy of the con-
vergence of the European welfare states. The integration of di¤erent welfare
states thus requires attention as the economic rami⁄cations of expenditure
convergence are relevant. In our study, one way to analyze the welfare state
is to extrapolate measurement from social expenditure data.
2 Review of the literature
The de⁄nition of the welfare state is broader in Europe than in any other
part of the world, and there is no doubt that the expenditures associated
with this welfare state de⁄nition impact the structure of the states them-
selves. Nevertheless, while all countries in Europe have advanced welfare
states, they are structured di¤erently and require di¤erent amounts of fund-
ing. These di¤erences may be one of the causes of divergent GDP growth
rates in anotherwise more-than-ever uni⁄ed Europe. Hence onthe structural
side questions are now arising.
Johnson (Johnson 1968) dealt with the question of the application of
economic theory to social issues. The de⁄nition of the welfare state that we
are going to retain considers two components, one ⁄scal and one structural.
3The former deals with social expenditures. In the latter welfare regulations
form the basis of welfare policy.
2.1 Welfare state as the next step
Changes in Europeanpolicies due tothe belonging to the EMUcould contrib-
ute to natural convergence between countries in public expenditures (Hitiris
and Nixon 2001). Still, some in the literature indicate that these di¤erences
are important enough so as to necessitate harmonization to speed up eco-
nomic integration (Hitiris 1997).
The construction of the European Union is centered on monetary policy,
with control of⁄scal policy left to theindividual countries. Anuncoordinated
⁄scal policy leaves individual countries with more independence, but will
undermine monetary coordination if there are no limitations to ⁄scal policy
(Delors 1989). The SGP is a form of policy coordination designed to deal
with problems associated with a ⁄scally decentralized Europe and forestall
deleterious individual ⁄scal policy and limit free riding. Depending on the
organization of the welfare state, one-way migration tra¢c may occur in
Europe, from states with poorly organized social systems to well-organized
welfare states (Holmlund and Kolm 2000). Di¤erent welfare structures will
cause migrations toward bene⁄cial systems.
2.2 Welfare State and Competitiveness
Alesina and Perotti (Alesina and Perroti 1997) examine the impact of the
composition of government spending on competitiveness. Distinguishing
between spending funded by reduced government spending and spending
funded by an increase in taxes yields di¤erent outcomes for the economy. As
competitiveness is a¤ected by how the welfare state is funded, considerations
arise for harmonization. The range of harmonization possibilities includes
measures such as common ⁄scal budgets; new free-riding possibilities present
themselves when a collective budget and individual taxation policy are al-
lowed.
Perotti (Perotti 1996) demonstrates that the composition of the welfare
state matters, which is relevant to considerations of ⁄scal policy consolida-
tion. Cutting government spending creates a long-term impact on a budget,
whereas measures such as tax increases and capital spending cuts have ef-
fects that are shorter-lived. Both GDP growth and competitiveness will be
4impacted by the structure of the welfare-distribution mechanism. The re-
lationship between social expenditure and GDP growth becomes important
with the consideration of harmonization. E¤ective limitations of govern-
ment spending, while promoting growth, can be achieved more readily under
certain conditions. Therefore, combining various welfare states and various
welfare state mechanisms becomes political and economic. When these dif-
ferent approaches center around social expenditure it becomes necessary to
study the nature of such expenditures and their relationship to the welfare
state.
2.3 The Welfare State and Europe
The Portuguese EU presidency has put in place a new European architec-
ture for social policy, something that could one day be considered Europezs
"Maastricht" for the welfare state. The welfare state is a notion well-covered
in the economic literature as well as the European economic integration, but
the combination of the two is still brand new.
A major reason to study the welfare state harmonization or coordination
comes from the costs ofa non-converging Europe. Indeed, it seems important
to question whether regional asymmetric shocks were also related to di¤erent
levels of spending in the welfare state programs (for instance, health care)
through the EU countries. As the EU moves toward economic integration
levels of income convergence will accelerate. The convergence of income-
dependent variables, such as health care expenditure, will also quicken. The
possibility that healthcare expenditures in the EUare currently approaching
common levels despite the lack of harmonization policies so far signals the
bene⁄t of considering such policies for the future (Hitiris and Nixon 2001).
Members of the EU are under pressure to curtail spending to stay within
the bounds of the Stability and Growth Pact, and some of this pressure will
be placed on health care budgets, possibly leading toward a common level.
3 Speci⁄cations of the Model
The level of various public expenditures and the structure of programs de-
signed to uphold welfare where the free market might not have an interest
is determined on a country level. The European Commission believes that
Europe could gain from a common monetary policy, with member countries
5acting as a group. Assessing the impact of structural di¤erences on the eco-
nomic health of the EMU may provide further gains and guide future policy
formation.
3.1 Purpose of the Model
There are many di¤erent ways of measuring the welfare state (Slesnick 1998)
and this paper will follow Barrzs methodology (Barr 1992). This paper will
use social expenditure data to re¢ect the composition of social welfare pro-
grams in European states. The data is from the OECD Social Expenditure
Database (the zSOCXz database), a data set covering social expenditures
both public and private in OECD countries from 1980-1998. The model ex-
amines changes in GDP growth and ¢uctuation in social expenditures, to
provide a meaningful foundation for an assessment of structural harmoniza-
tion in Europe.
3.2 Manipulation of the database
For this model, we have reformulated1 the database categories for consistency
and relevancy of the data set. Four new categories are designed2:
² zTotal social expenditurez is simply the sum of all programs listedinthe
SOCX database covering all public expenditure de⁄ned by the OECD
as providing for public welfare. To eliminate GDP e¤ects, zTotal social
expenditurez is divided by the GDP for each year.
² zOld Age Orientedz Variable, zOz The program zServices for the elderly
and disabledz was added to zOld age cash bene⁄tsz to create an zold age
orientedz variable.
² zFamily Orientedz Variable, zFz zFamily cash bene⁄tsz and zFamily ser-
vicesz are closely related within the SOCX database, and include public
expenditures to support households of more than one person.
1The reformulated data set includes some unaltered categories of the OECD database,
such as zUnemploymentz and zOld Age Cash Bene⁄ts,z but it also includes variables such
as the zFamily Orientedz variable re¢ecting the levels of several programs of similar aim.
2When several programs that serve a related purpose are combined in a reformulated
variable, the signi⁄cance of the new variable is in almost all cases greater than the indi-
vidual signi⁄cance of component programs.
6² zDisability Orientedz Variable, zDz The zDisability orientedz variable is
meant to cover bene⁄ts awarded to people to compensate for income
lost through sickness, injury, or the death of a spouse.
4 The Model
The goal of the econometrics is twofold: on the one hand, we measure the
structural impacts of national social expenditure on the growth rates. This
⁄rst step will help in understanding whether an economic policy devoted to
the social harmonization is worth or not, ceteris paribus. In other words, the
analysis will try to capture any structural impact of the social expenditure
from the data. If there is any, the harmonization might be desirable. In fact,
it would as long as the implementation of such an economic policy would
not generate new costs. In term of percentage of public social expenditure,
data do not clearly demonstrate a convergence of unemployment, disability,
family and old age programs (see ⁄gures 1, 2, 3, and 4). Indeed, the change
from a national economy structured by the national social expenditure to a
more homogeneous structure could also create negative externalities. Hence,
on the other hand, we measure the impact of a policy that would give way to
the European harmonization of social expenditure, the so-called |dynamic
e¤ect} model presented below. For econometric consistency, we also veri⁄ed
that di¤erent levels of social expenditures from year to year contribute to
¢uctuations in GDP.
What is important in this part of the analysis is not the level of the
expenditure, but the level of the di¤erence between countries. Policy consid-
erations will ultimately be founded on what can be determined about inter-
national growth asymmetries; using the di¤erences in amount of expenditure
to explainoutput ¢uctuations will begin this process. More complete answers
about social expenditurezs impact on GDP derive from policy comparison.
To this end policy choices in individual countries are examined to see if these
choices impact GDP growth. Policy choices are represented by the change
in the percentage of social expenditure for each variable and country. This
procedure, incorporating welfare program structure and underlying policy, is
an initial step toward determining precisely why output and growth asym-
metries exist. We will present the best results of the analysis based on four
core countries - France, Italy, Germany, and Spain. We retain the strongest
7Figure 1: Percentage of socex in unemployment programs
Figure 2: Percentage of socex in disability programs
8Figure 3: Percentage of socex in family programs
Figure 4: Percentage of socex in old age programs
9results to present the most statistically compelling arguments for harmoniz-
ation. Even in this extreme scenario in favor of harmonization, the costs of
implementation of an harmonization policy may still outweigh the expected
bene⁄ts of harmonization.
4.1 Structural impacts of the social expenditure on the
growth rates
Thepurposeofthis ⁄rstanalysis is toextract from the data theoverall picture
of any impact of social expenditure on the structure of the national econom-
ies. This methodology may provide insights into which speci⁄c countries can
bene⁄t or not from harmonization policies.
The model will look at di¤erences in changes in GDP growth between
countries relative to changes in social expenditures such as spending on edu-
cation, health care, and the variables available with the OECD data that the
model will use. The purpose of these tests is to build on the demonstration
by the previous tests that the level of social expenditure in various programs
has an impact on GDP by regressing the di¤erences in GDP growth between
countries on the changes in the level of social expenditure in those countries.
We have taken di¤erent econometric approaches to analyzing the data.
Modifying the variables beyond lagging them one period had little positive
a¤ect on the capabilities of the model.
Squaring the values of the variables was unsuccessful in improving even
theregressions involving Italy-Germany and Italy-Spain, but lagging the nat-
ural log of the variables successfully captured the non-linear aspects of the
behavior of the variables, as well as the delay between program implementa-
tion and impact on output. The direction ofcausality this question considers,
that social expenditures impact GDP growth, is further tested by using time
value minus one independent variables.
The lagged model for Italy-Germany, the ⁄rst model listed, that used
the natural log of the independent variables explained 62.3% of the behavior
of the independent variable, an improvement in terms of signi⁄cance of the
linear model, with no loss in descriptive power. The behavior of the variables
may be thus non-linear in some form; descriptive natural logs of variables
would imply that a percentage change in social expenditure produces a unit
change in GDP growth.
10Breitungzs test (Breitung 2002) for non-parametric data is used to de-
termine the presence of unit roots, and the Breusch-Pagan test is applied to
test for heteroscedasticrobustness. The presence ofunitrootsinthevariables
is improved by taking the natural log of each variable. L1ln-x denotes that
that both a lag and the natural log are used; the variables in each regression
may have one, both, or neither modi⁄cation.
² Italy-Germany, lin-log, lagged variables3
GDP0





² France-Germany, linear, lagged variables
GDP 0
FD = ¡3:135¡ 52:89L1ln-U + 109:76L1ln-O
¡144:28L1ln-F + 87:59-D + †;R
2
= :2803 (2)
² France-Italy, linear, lagged variables
GDP
0








FE = ¡0:742+ 8:91-OA +†;R
2
= :082 (4)
² Italy-Spain, linear, lagged variables
GDP0
IE = ¡:370 ¡ 93:547L1-U ¡ 90:004L1-H
¡84:089L1-OA ¡ 63:56-D+ †;R
2
= :5821 (5)
² Germany-Spain, linear, lagged variables
GDP
0




1-OA+ 104:227-D + †;R
2
= :5631 (6)
3See appendix 1 for further details.
11The results presented are the most descriptive ones, whether linear or
otherwise, that are heteroscedastistically robust, and those that would lend
the most support to harmonization.
The coe¢cients of the Italy-Germany regression are anticipated, as this
model represents purely structural e¤ects. Unemployment bene⁄ts generally
have a negative impact on GDP, as do disability bene⁄ts, but raising the
lifetime consumption function of the elderly increases output. The results
here are heteroscedastistically robust, and the presence of unit roots has been
diminished in some cases where necessary by taking the natural logarithm of
each independent variable. ANOVA tests did not reveal multicollinearity or
covariance.
4.2 Dynamic impacts of the social expenditure on the
growth rates
Changes in social expenditure as a percentage of GDP from year to year
re¢ects policy change. Policy di¤erences between two countries may impact
their output, causing their levels of growth to diverge. One of those ⁄rst two
countries, andanother, a thirdcountry may alsohave divergent growthlevels,
but at a rate di¤erent still from that between the ⁄rst two countries. Asym-
metric shocks due to discrepancies in social expenditures between countries
may exist.
4.2.1 Impacts of individual programs on di¤erences in growth
rates between countries
To investigate this possibility, the change in GDP is regressed on the change
in the level of social expenditure at the program level as a fraction of GDP.
Thechanges inprogramsizeas a percentageof GDPare examined for France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain, and then the di¤erences in program and output
growth are examined between each country. Variables, e.g. ©U for unem-
ployment, are derived:
©UF = (UF1997=GDPF1997)=(UF1996=GDPF1996) (7)
The equation takes the following form:
GDP0 = ﬂ0 + ﬂ1©a + ﬂ2©b + ﬂ3©c +† (8)
12Where © is the percentage change in program expenditure as a percent-
age of GDP from the previous year. Each ﬂ represents a di¤erent program
variable.
4.2.2 Impacts of combined program variables on di¤erences in
growth rates between countries
Analyzing the impact of policy changes on GDP growth within a particu-
lar country showed that policy changes in a given year or the previous year
did not have a consistent impact on GDP growth. These regressions re¢ect
the priority accorded given programs by measuring the relationship between
change in expenditures as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth. While in-
teresting to note that policy changes do not appear to a¤ect output growth
nationally, international relationships will shed light on harmonization pos-
sibilities.
France, Italy, and Spain all produce signi⁄cant results when their policy
changesz impact on GDP is compared with Germany. When comparing two
countries a and b, the variable ©ab is derivedby taking the di¤erence in values
for each country for a particular year:
©ab1997 = ©a1997 ¡ ©b1997 (9)
These di¤erences between Germany and the other countries produce de-
scriptive models. Attempts to capture possible non-linear e¤ects by squaring
the independent variables were chronically heteroscedastic in the error terms
and devoid of statistically signi⁄cant independent variables. All six combin-
ations of the four countries chosen were examined for di¤erent combinations
of variables.
In order to correct for the presence of a unit root in the data strings, due
to the modelzs non-parametric nature, the natural logs of each independent
variable was used where testing revealed this eliminated the unit root prob-
lem. Breitungzs non-parametric test (Breitung 2002) was again used to test
for the presence of unit roots in the independent variables.
In the analysis between Italy and Germany of the dynamic policy e¤ects
analyzed by this model, taking the natural logs of the independent variables,
69.8% of the behavior of the dependent variable was explained by the model.
The model was signi⁄cant overall and heteroscedastistically robust.
Following the Italy-Germany model are the most robust, most descriptive





















² France-Spain, linear, lagged variables
GDP0
FE = ¡:767¡ :156©OA +†, R
2 = ¡0:067 (13)
² Italy-Spain, linear, lagged variables
GDP
0




1©OA ¡ 2:5356©D + †, R
2
= :0406 (14)
² Germany-Spain, linear, lagged variables
GDP0
DE = ¡:0685+ 11:594©U ¡13:594-OA +†, R
2
= :3240 (15)
All results are heteroscedastistically robust and have been tested for the
presence of a unit roots. Variables where a unit root is present are replaced
with the natural log of the variable when that improves the unit root test. In
the cases where taking the natural log does not help, the unit root is likely
due to the small size of the data set.
Multicollinearity has not been observed. The heterogeneity of the fol-
lowing results suggests that policy changes would have variable impacts on
output, adding further uncertainty to harmonization considerations.
4See appendix 2 for further details.
14The signs of the coe¢cients of the Italy-Germany model here are some-
what di¤erent from those foundinthe structural regression, withthe Oldage
oriented variable having a negative coe¢cient while Unemployment and the
Disability oriented variable both have positive coe¢cients. This may re¢ect
the impact of changing policy, as opposed to the level (like in the structural
regression), decreasing the importance of factors suchas the opportunity cost
of not working. This regression takes into account not only macroeconomic
conditions but the a¤ects of uncoordinated international policy.
Based on these regressions, we can conclude that there are at least signi-
⁄cant di¤erences in the relationships between countries. Di¤erences between
countriesz growth rates can be explained by social expenditure sometimes,
but the inconsistent signs of the coe¢cients show that the di¤erences are not
uniform. The irregularities of these dynamic e¤ects will be addressed with
the policy implications.
5 Policy implications
The policy implications may be twofold. First, the analysis focused on ex-
plaining changes in GDP by changes in the amount of speci⁄c components of
social expenditure within a given country. Changes in GDP are determined
by many di¤erent variables, from wage levels, to ⁄rm pro⁄ts, to regulations.
We can demonstrate that changes in GDP are also related to changes in so-
cial expenditure. Being a part of the EMU, which may become more like
an OCA, the member countries may be interested in harmonizing particu-
larly those expenditure levels which have an impact on output ¢uctuations.
Second, knowing that social expenditure in the individual countries can ex-
plain changes in GDP, the next step was to explain the impact of changes
in social expenditure programs on di¤erences in GDP growth levels between
countries. We have measured two e¤ects, one structural and one dynamic.
The structural e¤ect captures the weight of the component programs in total
social expenditure. Withthe dynamic e¤ectwe capturethe impact ofchanges
in the cost of each social expenditure component.
On the one hand the econometric results demonstrate that there is a
relationship between the amount of program expenditure and changes in
GDP between countries. The di¤erences in the weight of individual social
programs between major countries in Europe explains di¤erences in GDP
growth. However, the di¤erences in GDP growth between major countries
15are not uniform. On the other hand, at once with econometric robustness
and macroeconomic relevancy we measure the existence of any dynamic ef-
fect. Changes in social expenditure policy are re¢ected in the econometrics
by the weight of component programs as a percentage of GDP. The relation-
ship between changes in this weight and changes in GDP growth has been
con⁄rmed, underscoring the impact of social expenditure policy changes on
output growth. Here the changes in program policy were measured rather
than the weight of each program. Based on the result that di¤erences in
social expenditure have an impact on GDP there may be a Pareto-optimal
level of social expenditure in Europe that can reduce discrepancies in GDP
growth.
We elucidated at once a structural e¤ect and a dynamic e¤ect, showing
that while harmonization may be bene⁄cial to smooth di¤erences in GDP
growth, harmonization must take into account the weight of each individual
program in the di¤erent countries. By doing so, the harmonization will lead
to a convergence of GDP. The Pareto-optimum solution is harmonization
that eliminates the idiosyncraticoutput shocks whichstemmed from di¤erent
social expenditure levels. The heterogeneity of the results obtained from the
zstructuralz regressions demonstrate that harmonization on a European level
would be at least di¢cult. But we also observe a dynamic e¤ect, the changes
in policy themselves, which creates additional discrepancies in GDP growth.
Europe may consider that the Pareto-optimum situation is represented by
no discrepancies in GDP growth, but policy change will amplify di¤erences
in growth trends.
Determination of an optimal expenditure level requires countries to con-
verge, and when countries change their policies to meet this level output
growth will diverge. The likelihood that this dynamic e¤ect is larger than
the gains represented by structural harmonization is high. This result may
con⁄rm on the social policy side that harmonization will not bring conver-
gence. As Krugman (Krugman 1993) forecast for the economies of the EMU,
harmonization of economic policy will lead to the ampli⁄cation of regional
comparative advantage; in other words, divergence.
Nevertheless, these results do not advocate in favor of cooperation to the
expenses of harmonization, but a third-way could be found: the |open co-
ordination} notion used in Luxembourg. Indeed, the policymakers could be
inspired by the Stability and Growth Pact and propose a harmonized price-
¢oor (Scharpf 1997) for welfare spending in eachcountry (the current average
is close to 25% of the GDP spent on welfare programs) leaving the freedom
16to allocate the resources on each program ⁄tting with the countryzs culture.
It would help create the incentive to converge without imposing strict pro-
cedures and facing the paradoxical outcome of harmonization: divergence.
6 Conclusion
This paper sought to provide at once an original measurement of the welfare
state by considering levels of social expenditure and its relationship to GDP
to further the discussion ofthe implications of harmonizingEuropean welfare
policies.
Optimum currency area theory suggests that certain regions should take
advantage of a common currency. With the creation of the Economic and
Monetary Union, Europe began monetary policy harmonization. The Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, limiting the public de⁄cit to three percent of GDP
is a rule that places a restriction, albeit nonspeci⁄c, on ⁄scal policy.
With a common monetary policy and a ⁄scal policy rule in place EMU
member countries have little recourse for unilateral maneuver when stimu-
lation or cooling becomes necessary. What remains for countries to do on
their own is to determine the level of public expenditure. The level of vari-
ous public expenditures and the structure of programs designed to uphold
welfare where the free market might not have an interest is determined on a
country level.
This paper did not discover evidence to support policy harmonization
on the European level for welfare programs - representing a big share of
the budget expenditure. Asymmetric output shocks exist, but are di¤erent
depending on the set of countries. Harmonization between countries that do
not display a relationship between social policy and growth trends could be
harmful and amplify swings in output growth. During the years following
harmonization the side e¤ects may be greater than the bene⁄ts.
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